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Interview with Caucasus Institute deputy director Sergey Minasyan.

 - The Defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh held military exercises from November 1-13. Do you think those were usual trainings, or some tactics were tested?

- Definitely, those exercises had both military significance, when combat readiness of NK Defense Army has been checked and political significance as well: signal to official Baku that resuming of military activities in conflict line may have serious military and political results and the country kicking them off may pay a very high price. Those exercises were the biggest ones after ceasing military activities in 1994, and maybe they exceeded in applied military equipments and number of artillery certain combats in 1993-94. For the first time NK Defense Army held exercises profoundly involved by all the army divisions.

- How could you explain that the process of those exercises was less covered by media?

- Maybe, the exercises more reminded military situation and some techniques were tested, the implementation of which, in case of military activities, would be sudden for the rival. Besides, Artsakh army tested some new armaments which NK Defense Army has recently achieved, and were veiled from the rival.

- It’s reported that some tactical tricks used during poor visibility conditions. Are similar tactics significant for Azerbaijani-Karabakhi conflict?

- In 1992-94 our army had combats at night or at bad climate, which was guarantee of successful operations. Having a method of conducting military activities during poor visibility situations or bad climate is evident that Armenian officers have sufficient army knowledge and readiness.

- One of the innovations of the exercises was sapper machine. It’s believed that such technique is used during offensive operations. Is this framed by NK Defense Army tasks?

- In case of military activities, NK side isn’t intended to make first offensive operations, since NK DA has settled all the political issues yet during the war of 1992-94. In the very first phase of any military activity, Artsakh Army has no intentions to make offensive operations. During the ceasefire years, NK side prepared well strengthened defensive line. Human resources and military equipments are needed to break that line, which will reduce the effectiveness of the attack and give opportunity to get prepared to counterattack. This defensive line is supposed to be effective.

- The exercises were held in Akn district of Askeran which is a few kilometers far from the line of contact. Thus, the Azerbaijani side just couldn’t take any notice of the scale of the exercises. Do you think similar exercises focus only military issues?

- It’s obvious that similar exercises where large scale of armament, artillery and aviation was used, targets psychological pressure over the potential rival. Azerbaijan paid attention on the previous exercises, sometimes their remarks were really funny. For example, their army speaker Sabiroglu declared that Artsakh used “5-6 tanks and a few other armaments” to hold military exercises (http://news.day.az/politics/238349.html). While Azerbaijani media reported that the firings and blasts could be felt and heard in some places.
If 350 tanks and other armaments are assessed as “5-6 tanks” by the Azerbaijani defense ministry, then the situation is really funny. Making great military threats of attacks and having convinced them in armament, they lost the sense of reality. Underestimating the rival and being too much confident with own power have played a good trick with Azerbaijan in 1992-94.

- You’ve touched upon military oriented statements. It’s interesting to hear your opinion over possibilities to resume military activities and their results.

- War is a very serious thing to treat it not seriously. Though Azerbaijani makes military statements, there are people who acknowledge the military balance in the conflict, the possible reaction and assessment of foreign and powerful states, as well as the results of the war provocated by them. Resuming the war and having it lost, Azerbaijan will lose not only Karabakh but many other adjacent lands. That will mean the end of I. Aliyev’s administration, since being defeated and having loses in human resources and finance, they will face the same fate as previous Azerbaijani leaders after defeat in Karabakh. Baku won’t manage a rapid war, hence they don’t start it, of course, if they aren’t blind with the reality.

- To conclude Vladimir Kazimirov covered the ceasefire regime violation of 1994 in one of his stories stating that Heydar Aliyev asked ceasefire from Armenians of Karabakh. V. Kazimirov wrote in 1994 Baku was alarmed how to stop Armenians from advancing to Rivert Kur. If Azerbaijan kicks off a new war, will NK Defense Army be interested in advancing that much?

- If large scale military activities resume, Artsakh will not only take initiative of offensive operations, but will attack Azerbaijan’s important industrial, communication and other objects. And this very sense of “counter value blows” makes them avoid military activities. It has restrictive effect of military-technical balance.