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Iranian Diplomacy’s exclusive interview with Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs

- There was optimism in the first 24 hours of the Geneva-2 negotiations which somehow overshadowed the difficulty of the task at hand. Following the non-agreement at the last minute in the negotiations ten days ago, it seems that this task has become more difficult. What have caused negotiations in this round to be more difficult than the previous ones?

- There is one common difficulty in both the Geneva-2 talks and this round and that is the discussion of the context. In New York and in Geneva-1, we talked more about the approach and the structure of a possible agreement but in Geneva-2 we started to talk about the context. Although we have made good progress in the context but the outcome in Geneva-2 showed that the task is not very easy. The point is that, despite their claims of unity and harmony, creating unity and coalition between six countries is very difficult. The interesting point is that there were differences between the western countries of the group and this by itself proves the difficulty of the task. Discussions about the context will continue in Geneva but it must be accepted that during the past ten days, the forces and parties which oppose these negotiations have had a chance to express their views and the result of these attempts will present itself in the upcoming negotiations in Geneva. Therefore, our job is more difficult this time around for we should discuss the context more seriously and there has also been some opposition which will show itself in these negotiations. Thus, we are confronted with two-fold difficulty and on this basis, I believe that the Geneva-3 negotiations will be much more difficult. But what the other party must know is that we will negotiate with one voice and cannot deal with multiple voices.

- Has what happened in Geneva-2 impacted your optimism for achieving success in this round of negotiations? Are you optimistic or pessimistic about this round of negotiations?

- They have certainly had effects. As a diplomat I am never pessimistic nor optimistic. If we are not optimistic in diplomacy, no progress can be made but to answer the question of how optimistic or pessimistic we are with regard to the outcome of these negotiations, I must say that it is still too early to tell. We cannot have a correct judgment until we start the negotiations and see what impacts the forces opposing negotiations have had on the practical trend of the task.

- During the past few days, many western media outlets have talked about recognizing Iran’s right to enrichment. An example is Time magazine which, in its latest issue, has reiterated that the term “right” is the same word which can overshadow the entire negotiations. What right does Iran seek to be recognized? As Iran’s Foreign Minister has stated we do not seek its recognition because based on the NPT we enjoy this right by nature.

- There are different interpretations of uranium enrichment in the NPT. Western countries have an interpretation of the NPT based on which the right to research, develop, produce and use nuclear energy is considered separate from the issue of enrichment and they claim that enrichment is not included in this process. Contrary to this group, other countries like Iran believe that the right to enrichment is included in the same process and is part of the production stages of peaceful nuclear energy. There are differences in this regard. The western countries and the US do not accept enrichment as a right but they view it as part of a practical program and accept it as a reality in the practical scene. But as you said, they might have different views with regard to different cases; to accept it in one case and reject it in another.

- Does Iran seek to place the term “right” in any agreement made with the P5+1?

- Iran’s nuclear rights must be considered in any agreement. We insist that the term “right”, meaning the peaceful use of nuclear energy for Iran, must be included in the text of the agreement. But we do not start to interpret this term. The intention is that our enrichment program must be accepted both in words and in practice.

- Many claim that it is better that discussions about the issue of uranium enrichment be postponed to other rounds of negotiations due to its high sensitivity so as to not create a fundamental challenge in reaching a final agreement. Would you agree with this approach?

- Not only with regard to the issue of the enrichment but regarding many other issues as well, some people propose the same suggestion, stating that it is better that this issue or that issue be postponed to later steps. The fact that some state that a certain issue is better to be postponed to later negotiations due to its sensitivity is a trap from which we always escape. That is why Iran insisted that the elements of the final step must also be defined from the beginning. This means that even if the other party does not consider the right to enrichment in the last step in his mind, it must state it. If the West intends to continue negotiations, it not only must state that enrichment continues at the present time but that it will consider this right in the last step as well. This issue is one of the key points upon which we insist and will not back down from.

- In his visit to Israel, Francois Hollande talked about Paris’ four desired points which must be written in the text of the agreement with Iran in the first step. One of them was the issue of storing Iran’s enriched uranium. Do the western countries mean the 5% uranium or the 20% uranium which is said to be 120 kilos?

- We will negotiate behind the negotiating table and the details will be discussed there. The issue of enrichment is our red line and this is the point which we have reiterated many times but the dimensions and percentages are negotiable. We cannot discuss the details based on the agreement made between the members of the negotiating groups to keep the details confidential. With regard to the statements made by Francois Hollande, I am not in a position to either confirm or deny them but discussing the details of negotiations prior to an agreement by the parties to make them public is not a good sign. This matter does not show the seriousness of the other party in negotiation. Such an approach indicates that the P5+1 countries are not united. We hope that this trend will be corrected before Geneva-3. We expect them to talk with us with a united position and remain committed to their commitments. This is the most basic commitment upon which all members of the P5+1 insisted.

- Right now that nuclear negotiations are part of the responsibilities of the Foreign Ministry, what role has been considered for the High Council of National Security in this process?

- The responsibility of the nuclear dossier, as any other important issue, is on the shoulders of the High Council of National Security. The process of decision-making and directing this issue is determined by this council and it is enforced by the related institutions. Right now negotiations have been delivered to the Foreign Ministry. The technical dimensions of this dossier are pursued by the Atomic Energy Organization. Issues like the number of centrifuges and production have no relation to the task followed by the Foreign Ministry. Thus, the status of the High Council of National Security remains the same. Based on the Constitution, all important decisions including the nuclear dossier are made in the High Council of National Security. Approving the principles of negotiations and the agreement which is to be made are also among the responsibilities of this council. The Foreign Ministry is responsible for the implementation of negotiations and the related agenda.

- What is the status of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the negotiation process?

- The Parliament has its own status. It has both legislative and supervisory roles. The Parliament can define our nuclear policy by adopting laws, like when a law was adopted that the voluntary enforcement of the Additional Protocol cannot be enforced by the government, and the government of the time obeyed this law. The Parliament has the right to interfere in the principles of nuclear policy. It also has a supervisory role through which it can be assured that the laws of the country and the principles set by the Parliament are correctly implemented in the nuclear negotiations.

- Don’t you think that the extent of the Parliament’s involvement in nuclear negotiations in the 11th administration is more than the 9th and 10th administrations?

- Even if your statement is correct, we welcome this approach.

- Don’t you think that the extent of the activity and presence of the Parliament has made the task more difficult for the negotiating team?

- Our task is already difficult and we have, hitherto, spent a lot of time explaining the issues to the Parliament but we welcome this issue because it would make us more assured of our own task. The supervision and control of the people’s representatives over the negotiations will give us greater strength.

- During this period of time, have there been circumstances wherein the details of negotiations which were not given to the media and the public have been given to the representatives?

- Naturally, representatives are trusted by their constituents and those parts of negotiations about which the representatives should know have been explained in different sessions. The Speaker of the Parliament is specifically aware of the details of these negotiations. Mr. Larijani himself will explain for the representatives whatever is necessary and whenever we attend the parliamentary sessions we will discuss the details according to the level of the meeting and whether it is public or private.

- In the run-up to the beginning of negotiations, Israeli media announced that the US and Iran have behind-the-scenes channels for negotiation and that what we see in the form of the P5+1 is just on the surface. Are contacts between Tehran and Washington more than those of Iran with other P5+1 members?

- In my opinion, the Zionist regime is the first to oppose any agreement with Iran. I witnessed first-hand how this regime went to any length to prevent the progress of negotiations. Their role in the last Geneva talks was clear and obvious. One of their moves during this time has been to create a negative atmosphere and to somehow contaminate the political atmosphere. Another one of their moves has been to question Iran’s foreign policy and the negotiating team. These are media tricks that have been used either directly by the Zionist regime itself or by media outlets affiliated with it. In my opinion, we should not follow this line and doubt the sincerity of negotiations. Yes, it is true that we have negotiated with the Americans during the past few months, but this has only been on the sidelines of the P5+1 meetings. Mr. Zarif met with John Kerry in New York and Iranian and American representatives also met with each other in Geneva-1 and Geneva-2 and also in the expert meeting held in Vienna. This is not a covert affair. On the issue of sanctions, due to the fact that a great part of them have unilaterally been enforced by the US, we have had a lot of discussions with them. But all of these discussions have been held in the framework of P5+1 negotiations and this is a natural issue for us.

- As an individual that is present in these negotiations, do you feel that a rift has been created in Washington-Tel Aviv relations regarding the approach towards Iran’s nuclear dossier?

- In my opinion, there are huge differences of opinion between them and these differences are evident. However, this does not mean that they are not strategic allies. What I mean is that, because of the specific interests that each has in Iran’s nuclear dossier and Obama’s interests and opinions on this issue, differences have formed. However small, these differences have helped to open a small window for progress in P5+1 negotiations. We have to take advantage of the opening of this window. But this does not mean that the US has forgotten about Israeli interests. We have to take advantage of the differences of opinion that the US now has with Israel about how to provide its interests. In the previous Geneva meeting, as you were able to see, we moved forward in preparing the draft, and then another P5+1 member prevented this, and from the activities observed before and after the negotiations, everyone realized whom that member had coordinated itself with.

- Do you think France has convinced the other members to go along with it this time around too or will the other members neutralize France’s efforts, even if this is done secretly?

- This issue will become clear in the negotiations. Despite all that took place, we witnessed that, at the end of the Geneva-2 meeting, the P5+1 was able to revive its alliance and provide a text for Iran as a final agreed-upon text. But because of certain greedy demands that existed in the text, we did not accept. Due to the change in the format of talks, further discussions were scheduled for this round of negotiations. This time, we have to wait and see whether they maintain the same position as before or not. Or whether the text they put on the table is agreed upon by all or whether there are differences among them again. If they come forward with a united voice, negotiations will move forward. If different voices are heard from their side, talks will once again be defeated.

- If the same text that was proposed to you at the last minute in the Geneva-2 meeting is proposed tomorrow, will you accept it?

- If this text is agreed upon, it will be the basis for negotiations. When we hold the first meeting, we will conclude whether to accept their initial text for negotiations. If we accept this text as the basis for negotiations, it will be just be the beginning. We would enter into talks about the text and a number of mistakes might exist on every page of the text. We have not yet agreed to accept their text as the negotiation text.