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Panorama.am presents an interview with Dr. Ian Bremmer, president and founder of Eurasia Group and the author of Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World. 

- Dr. Bremmer, in your latest book Every Nation for Itself you describe the world with no single global power dominating it, which you call a “G-zero world”. In this state of affairs where do you see on the one hand the future of Russia and the Eurasian Union that’s now being created and on the other hand the future of Europe as it is “muddling through”?

- In a G-Zero environment where there is a lack of global leadership and less willingness to respond collectively to transnational issues, Putin is doing very well for himself—but unfortunately, he hasn’t used this preferable environment as an opportunity to help implement reform in Russia. Instead, he has been pursuing foreign policy objectives that may bolster his image, but don’t always translate to a better situation for the average Russian citizen. The global power vacuum was certainly on display for his two principal diplomatic successes of the past year: the gains in Ukraine, where he pulled $15 billion out of his country’s pension fund to bail out Kiev, and his success in Syria, where he led the push for a chemical weapons deal that dialed down the chance of American military incursion. The same is indeed true of Snowden. Russia has gained geopolitically from all of this: Moscow has more freedom of action, and an enhanced ability to influence neighbors and far-flung actors alike. But the domestic picture—particularly the economics—is looking bleak. Russia’s 2013 GDP growth was a paltry 1.3%. With figures like that, Russia is looking more like a submerging market than an emerging market BRIC. In this environment, more integration—economically and politically—which seems like the current trajectory for many Eurasian countries, is no economic prize.

In Europe, what we’re witnessing is not much of a recovery, but it’s still a positive story that the region has gotten through the recession—and there is no longer an imminent threat to the survival of the Eurozone itself (that risk was always overstated by those who didn't believe or understand the inherent political stability in the actors and institutions). But even if existential fears are off the table, there is not enough growth in the "recovery" to improve the bleak employment picture—particularly youth employment—both in the periphery and in France. And the growth we do see will not be evenly distributed: a disproportionate amount of the economic recovery will benefit a select few at the top, only exacerbating income inequality concerns. Anti-EU and euro sentiment is accordingly on the rise. While it’s still a long way off, over time, this is set to become a grass roots danger to European stability that's much more problematic than the top down danger from the banking crisis.

- You argue that the new state of world affairs will produce more conflict rather than cooperation. Do you foresee an increase in the rivalry between Russia and Europe as conflicting blocs of power (in which small countries have to choose with whom to side) or do you think a closer economic cooperation between Russia and Europe in future can be a possibility?

- It’s pretty clear that conflict is steadily ramping up—and smaller powers will more often have to choose one way or the other between Russia and Europe, when they would rather not have to make a hard call. Ukraine is Exhibit A for this trend: it would be in Ukraine’s best interest to hedge between the EU and Russia with an amount of liberty to pivot, but increasingly it finds its wiggle room disappearing. Russia had the capacity to force Ukraine’s hand and make it commit to more Russian integration. But how much that rankles Europe (not that much) is another matter altogether: Europe is distracted with European reform and focused inward. Expanding the EU is not the priority now, or for the foreseeable future. Europe is increasingly German-led—and Germany’s international perspective is much less about great power conflict than, say, that of Britain or France.

- In the given geopolitical setting how do you evaluate the prospects of Armenia’s development and her path towards the Russia-led Customs Union in particular? In general do you envision any changes in the policies pursued by the dominant powers in the South Caucasus region?

- Unfortunately, there aren’t many options for Armenia out there, and their two best bets will be driven by factors that are out of their control— they need to hope these go right for them, and if they do, then they need to capitalize on it. The best thing for Armenia geopolitically is, one, Iran to strike an international deal that allows for a healthier Iran from an economic standpoint; Armenia would be wise to leverage Iran as an investment destination, a place for trade and transit. Second—and longer term—Armenia could benefit from Turkey getting its house in order so that the two countries can work to normalize relations over time. Number one, Iran, is a real possibility and a priority. Number two looks quite unlikely.

So when it comes to changes in policies from the dominant regional powers, the two biggest open questions come from Iran and Russia. If Iran emerges from suffocating sanctions and Armenia plays its cards right, this could play in its favor. As for Russia, this is the true growing wildcard. Putin’s behavior has become more volatile and harder to predict. On top of this, there are economic troubles, and the popularity of the government has waned somewhat. If you have to have all your eggs in one basket, it isn’t the best place to choose. But after Putin’s recent visit—with a historically large delegation in tow—and the extensive new agreements inked between the two countries, it seems that doubling down on Russia is precisely what Armenia has been doing of late. Russia will remain the most important geopolitical player for Armenians for a long time to come—for better or worse.

- Zbignew Brzezinski has lately stated that “the US has lost much of the leverage it had a score of years ago”, adding that Washington is not likely to ever recover its position as the dominating global force, at least in the near future. Do you share this view? If so then does this have any implications for the South Caucasus region?

- While many pundits are making the case that the United States is in decline, it has not lost its dominant position as an economic force; in fact, it is arguably comparatively stronger than it was before the financial crisis. The dollar is firmly holding its position as the world’s reserve currency, the United States’ recovery has gained traction (even if the pace is still modest), and it is a huge, diverse and stable investment destination. But even as America maintains its economic prowess, it is completely true that the United States is in decline when it comes to foreign policy engagement. A poorly defined, more risk-averse US role in the world has allies confused about Washington’s longstanding policy preferences and commitments—and frustrated with how opaque they seem. They are actively questioning some of America’s security guarantees and worrying about Washington’s reluctance to deploy military, economic, and diplomatic capital. This all ties back to a world of Every Nation For Itself, where it is to be expected that the world’s sole superpower will be dismantling some of its commitments abroad.

But as all of these momentous, structural changes in the geopolitical international landscape transform America’s role therein, it will only have a muted impact in the South Caucasus. That’s because the United States has long been a marginal player in this area—and that is not going to change.

by Nvard Chalikyan