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Panorama.am has spoken with Dr. Asbed Kotchikian, senior lecturer at Global Studies Department at Bentley University (US) and Editor-in-Chief of Armenian Review, on some issues related to the current phase of the Armenian-Turkish conflict and of the US-Turkey relations.  

- Dr. Kochikian, the RA President has recently recalled the Armenian-Turkish protocols from the National Assembly, a move which followed 6 years of Turkish non-action and destructive stance full of preconditions regarding the normalization of bilateral relations. Could you please comment on this behaviour of Turkey? What policy do you think lay behind this attitude?

- The first thing one needs to think about is why President Sargsyan signed the protocols in the first place and why he is retracting it now after the protocols were suspended for almost 5 years.

Returning to the issue of Turkey’s policies and preconditions, there is nothing new about the official Ankara stance on normalizing its relations with Armenia. Since the 1990s the two preconditions to normalize relations with Armenia, Turkey has always put forward were the withdrawal of Armenian forces from what Ankara considered to be ‘occupied territories’ in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian side dropping the campaign to have Turkey recognize its responsibility for the Genocide of Ottoman Armenians.

As for the reasons for such a policy, one has to realize that Ankara’s solidarity with Baku over the past two decades is motivated by geopolitical and economic interests that far outweigh the normalization of relations with Armenia. In other words, normalizing relations with Armenia could be viewed as a diplomatic achievement in Turkey and nothing more, whereas antagonizing Azerbaijan would have economic and financial consequences for Turkey in the form of decreased Azerbaijani investments especially in Anatolia. By the same token, linking normalization with Armenia with Yerevan dropping its support to Genocide recognition campaign is directly related to the fact that Ankara considers that as a nuisance and wants to settle the issue of responsibility because of hears of territorial claims that might follow such recognition.

- Despite the failure of the reconciliation process what gains, if any, do you think the Armenian side has had during these years as a result of its initiative to normalize the relations with Turkey? (What are the lessons learned?) 

- If I were to reformulate the question, I would ask “what gains could the Armenian side have had with Ankara’s lack of interest to ratify the protocols”? The main lesson I think is that Yerevan could have played a more proactive role and could have used Turkey’s lack of interest to ratify the protocols as a diplomatic initiative to show the world that while Armenia is willing to normalize relations with Turkey, it is the latter which comes up with hurdles and preconditions to not open the border with Armenia. Had Armenia’s diplomacy been more proactive, it would have taken a huge advantage of this fact and could have levelled the playing field with Turkey by exercising diplomatic pressure on Ankara. Imagine a situation where Armenia could have publicized that it was all for normalizing relations with Turkey without any preconditions and that it was Turkey which was putting conditions and acting as a spoiler. That could have been a great diplomatic move and would have changed the world’s perception about Armenia’s foreign policy.

Other than the issue mentioned above, there have been no tangible gains and lessons to learn, except for the fact that Turkey’s role as an uncompromising and disruptive neighbour is further enhanced in Armenian government and public circles. One thing that needs to be added here is that the best strategy that Armenia can pursue to resolve issues (or at least some of the issues) with Turkey is through direct engagement with Ankara. In this context, direct engagement means constant communication, discussions and the possibility to sign agreements that deal with secondary issues (trade, transportation, communication, etc.) to show that the Armenian side it making an effort and it is Turkey that has been disruptive of the whole process.

 - Don’t you think that Turkey is perceived as being uncompromising and disruptive now in the eyes of the international community given its respective behavior?

- I don’t think Turkey’s image in the international community is one of uncompromising and disruptive in this case, mostly because of the fact that Armenian foreign policy never used the non-ratification of the protocols by Turkey as a diplomacy tool. True, there were a lot of discussions in Armenian media about it but that was for local consumption and the uncompromising position of Turkey was not publicized in international circles as it should have been. This is what I meant by a more proactive foreign policy and lost opportunity. If Armenia really had wanted Turkey to ratify the protocols, then it could have raised concerns about this and asked the guarantors of that signature to pressure Turkey to ratify the protocols.

- What steps do you think should be taken to facilitate the awakening of the civil society in Turkey, which is lobbying for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish government?

- One needs to realize that in the past decade or so, Turkey has gone through a lot of socio-political changes and transformation. There are more civil society groups and citizen initiative groups that advocate for a more free and democratic Turkey. It is important to understand that the recognition by Turkey of the Ottoman responsibility for the Armenian Genocide can only occur in a democratic Turkey. That being said, just focusing on civil society groups in Turkey which only deal with campaigning for Genocide recognition is a wrong strategy, any movement that aims at creating a more democratic and free Turkey should be supported. As citizens of Turkey, many Armenians have taken part in this process and big advocates for democratization in Turkey knowing full well that a free and democratic Turkey would also be a place where Armenians (and other minorities) can talk about their past, present and future in Turkey.

In this context, Armenia can only have a supporting role for such movements, but to avoid hypocrisy, Armenia has to also develop its own track record and develop a stronger sense of citizen participation in politics and society (and not just from one election to another). Tacit approval of any group in Turkey might have an opposite reaction and opponents of such civil society groups can easily claim that Armenia is meddling in the internal affairs of Turkey and those groups in Turkey could easily be discredited.

- Could you comment on the current phase of the relations (and tensions) between the United States and Turkey? 

- The main issue dictating US-Turkey relations today is the rise of The Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and the change of the military and geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. From a US perspective, Turkey remains an important ally in the region however there is a growing frustration in Washington that Ankara is not doing more to curb ISIL activities in the region (especially considering that Turkey has over 1,000 kms of land border with Syria and Iraq). The lack of Turkish involvement (perhaps very limited involvement) in this conflict has not stopped US policy makers to maintain that Turkey remains a (semi)reliable partner in the region and an important player to stop the danger from ISIL to spread.

Prof. Asbed Kotchikian is a senior lecturer at the Global Studies Department at Bentley University where he teaches courses on the Middle East and former Soviet Union. He has published articles and book chapters in various venues including Demokratizatsya, Insight Turkey, and Central Asia and the Caucasus. His book, entitled The Dialectics of Small States: Foreign Policy Making in Armenia and Georgia, was published in 2008. He is also the editor-in-chief of the academic peer reviewed journal, Armenian Review.