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The Decembrist revolt in 1825 incited a new Russo-Persian war having a great impact on the Yerevan Armenians' fate .Armenian journalist and researcher ArisGhazinyan writes about it in his book “Yerevan: with a cross or on the cross,” which is an attempt of setting and considering an extremely diverse range of processes directly or indirectly forming the character of the development of the territory in question and predetermining the inevitability of turning Yerevan into the main center of the Eastern Armenia, and later on into the capital of the recovered Armenian state.

In Persia, theDecembrist revoltwas incorrectly interpreted; they perceived the events in Russia as a struggle of two pretenders to the imperial throne and decided that it was a convenient opportunity for recovering the lost positions and for returning the lands. Replenishing a new army with the help of European instructors and having no doubt in its capability of returning the territories lost in 1813, PrinceAbbas Mirza decided to use that favorable (in his opinion) moment.

“In late July of 1823, the 40-thousand army of the Persian successor to the throne invaded the southern borders of the Russian Empire from several directions (including, from the direction of the Yerevan khanate)and took its way to Karabakh fortress Shushi. The campaign’s main and final aim was to enter Tiflis –the Russian administration’s center in the Caucasus. A new Russo-Persian war started,”Ghazinyan writes noting that the entire Armenian population of the city stood for a liberation fight – the last skirmish for preserving their Yerevan.

According to Ghazinyan, it was an unprecedented statistics of common citizens' exploits, it was a real moment of truth with exasperation, which struck even the Russian soldiers and officers tempted in every possible battle. 

“The names of the Yerevan heroes (HakobHarutyunyan, Hovhannes Aslanyan, HarutyunManukyan, MkrtichKostandyan, HamazaspYesayan, Aghasi etc.) have been made into a city folklore long ago. It is important to emphasize that the revolt in the city anticipated the military action in the Persian territory for about a year (in the first phase of the war, the military action took place in the borders of the Russian Empire – in Zangezur, Karabakh, part of Talish, but no way in Yerevan),” he writes.

While the Armenian population of Meghri and Goris (the southern wing of the Persian invasion) showed a fierce resistance, the Muslims supported their coreligionists.

Ghazinyan notes that in summer of 1826, it became obvious that the fate of the isolated Yerevan rebels, just like the fate of the city itself, already depended on Karabakh. The Yerevan revolt was suppressed in the fiercest way being isolated both in time (the war did not step over the borders of the Persian Empire) and in space (in fact, the city was an enclave in the Turkic encirclement and was blocked from all sides). “Nevertheless, theYerevanrevoltgrew. The slogan – now or never –reflected not only the pathos poetry of that emotional time, butrather the prose of the urban space. On the last day of July, the entire Armenian population of the city – barbers and soap boilers, tanners and furriers, millers and peccaries, tinsmiths and blacksmiths, braziers and dyers, gardeners and wine growers – stood for the last fight, it was an apotheosis of self-sacrifice,” Ghazinyan writes.

The Russian command knew about the state of affairs in Yerevan; however, in the summer of 1826, it did still not possess resources necessary for a military campaign, which is proved by general Yermolov’s letter to Czar: “The Erivan khanate should be occupied by standing firm in it. Otherwise, the Persians will destroy a significant amount of Christians living there, who are looking forward to us.”

The invasion of the Persian successor to the throne in the borders of the Russian Empire became “an official surprise” despite all the precautions, just like the position of the Muslim population, which was revealed in the form of a mass support to the hostile army by borderline Tatar guards and in the promotion of activities of numerous “fifth columns.”

By the autumn of 1826, the Russian command hadcarried out personnel changes in the army, including strengthening “the Armenian factor.” The situation changed cardinally with the appointment of RostomMadatyan -- more famous as Valerian Madatov -- as the commander of the Russian army in Shushi direction. “This native of Karabakh participated in several wars, including in the Patriotic War of 1812 (then he received Order of St. Anna of 2nd degree with diamonds for the Battleof Kobryn, Order of St. George of 4th degree for theBattle of Kalisz, Order of St. Vladimir for the Battle of Lucerne, and the Gold Sword for Bravery with diamonds),” Ghazinyan writes noting that this officer’s bravery and boldness were contiguous with imprudence.

He also highlights another nuance: the national liberation struggle of the Armenian nation in the general context of the Russo-Persian war had a significant impact on the determination of his actions in the 1826 campaign. Ghazinyanwrites that Madatov could prevent the Georgian tsarevitch’s appearance in Kakheti and in the North Caucasus (according to the British-Persian plan, that very appearance should have become the signal to a Caucasian rebellion against Russia).

“The Georgian tsarevitch’s isolation had a great significance. The fact is that, among other things, he was called to raise a certain part of the Christian population against the Russians therefore making the war necessarily large-scale, and accordingly,to pull out its religious context (confrontation between the Christians and Muslims) and putting the war in an all-Caucasian context,”Ghazinyan writes.

Nevertheless, the Russian army did not possess the necessary resources for carrying out offensive operations in the initial period of the war. Even Valerian Madatov,impetuous in his eagerness to attack, was limited in actions. Therefore, he was entrusted only with defensive functions: blocking the Dilijan ravine, retaining the Kazakh Turkic-Tatars from rebellion, ending the robberies, repressing the Muslim movement inElizavetpol and Shamshadin. It was also ordered firmly to yield to the Red Bridge and take positions on the river Khram, in case the Persian army appeared in Karabakh. However, Pottoemphasizes that “Madatov did not think aboutretreat.”

In the end of summer of 1826, Ivan Paskevich, the General of the Infantry,was sent to the Caucasus. He was initially under the submission of the Caucasian Corps Commander Aleksey Yermolov, and his appearance in the Caucasus marked the period of the Russian army’s offensive operations, which Valerian Madatov sought to. In September of 1826, his troops had brilliant victories near Shamkhor and Elizavetpol, after which Abbas Mirza had to lift the siege of Shushi and move his positionsaside. In these circumstances, the consideration of the Russian army’s attack on Yerevan became possible.

According to Russian military historian Potto, soon after Abbas Mirza’s defeat near Elizavetpol and escape from Karabakh, the Persians were expatriated from the Russian lands borderingwith the Erivan khanate.

Remarkably,many Decembrists participated in the war. Paskevich personally judged many of them. 

To be continued
ArisGhazinyan’s “Yerevan: with a cross or on the cross” is a book about the social and political history of Yerevan and Yerevan district (as a habitat) since the declaration of Christianity to the beginning of XIX century. In addition to demonstrating historical facts based on archive documents and sources, the book also considers the fundamental theses of the Azerbaijani historiography and Pan-Turkic ideology aimed at appropriating the historical, cultural, and spiritual heritage of the Armenians and other nations of the region by falsifying their history.