Aris Ghazinyan: Persian army intended to liquidate main symbol of Armenian faith, Etchmiadzin Cathedral, in August 1827
There were countless crucial “moments of truth” in the Armenian history, one of which came in August 1827, when the Persian army decided to liquidate the main symbol of the Armenian faith, Etchmiadzin Cathedral, to demotivate and deideologizeits disobedient citizens – the Armenians. Armenian journalist and researcher ArisGhazinyan writes about it in his book “Yerevan: with a cross or on the cross,” which is an attempt of setting and considering an extremely diverse range of processes directly or indirectly forming the character of the development of the territory in question and predetermining the inevitability of turning Yerevan into the main center of the Eastern Armenia, and later on into the capital of the recovered Armenian state.
The main forces left in Etchmiadzin were Sevastopol regiment and the Armenian cavalry, and it was obvious that no matter how desperately they struggled, they were not capable of resisting the pressure of thearmy of thirty thousand. Rejecting the offer of capitulation, they decided to endure till the end. Blessing the soldiers, Archbishop Nerses did not leave the Etchmiadzin monastery either. When the Persian army started a massive canon shooting on the monastery, the Russians and Armenians were defending together. Therewasnowheretoexpectsupportfrom.
“At that time, there was an incident nobody expected,neither commander Paskevich, the forces defending the Etchmiadzin monastery, archbishop Nerses, nor the thirty-thousand army of the Persian successor to the throne, Abbas Mirza.It was so unplanned and extemporaneous that became a military casus to some extent; it did not arise from the alignment of forces and the logics of the military time; several commentators still consider it a ‘military-strategic failure’, ‘misunderstanding’, ‘contrary action’. However, that very incident inscribed AfanasyIvanovichKrasovsky's glorious namein the history of the Armenian nation,” Ghazinyan writes.
Later, theOshakanBattlewouldbecalledthefiercestfightin thewholeCaucasianWar, andonAugust 17, 1827, abloodybattleburstoutbetweenthe army of thirtythousand of the successortothePersianthrone, AbbasMirza,andgeneralKrasovsky’sRussiandetachment of threethousand. The general decided to oppose the whole army.
“Showing amazing courage and selflessness, the detachment overthrew the enemy’s fierce attacks, broke through the encirclement, reached Etchmiadzin, saved the stronghold of the Armenian faith from complete destruction and ruin, and the defending monasteryfrom inevitable extermination,”Ghazinyan writes.
“In the evening of August 16, General Krasovskydecidedto set out with the detachment of three thousand on the Oshakan road marking the apogee of the Russo-Persian war’s heroic spirit,” the author adds.
The Oshakan Battle was heating up;the small Russian detachment was attempting to break through the Persian encirclement for more than seven hours and to solve the main problem of the “imprudent rush” – to arrive in time for supporting the sieged Etchmiadzin.
The Armenian voluntary unit fought in the hard and imprudent battle. Krasovsky particularly wrote about Armenian HakobHarutinov’s heroic self-sacrifice, who at the fiercest moment of the battle, directed the canon shots in a way that the missiles hit not the Russian, but the Persian troops.
“By the evening of August 17, Krasovsky’s detachment had done the impossible – it had broken through the massive barrier, made the hostile forces besieging the monastery escape, and entered into Etchmiadzin triumphantly under bell ringing,”Ghazinyan writes.
The significance of the Oshakan Battle is a synthesis of ideological, moral, and military accomplishments, which almost entirely demoralized the Persian army causing sardarHuseynKuliKhan’s panic escape from Yerevan and Abbas Mirza’s retreat.
Participant of the battle, Decembrist EvdokimLachinov, wrote that the Oshakan Battle had completely killed the Persian army’s spirit, and became the main reason of further splendid successes. In his turn, military historian and chronicler VasilyPotto writes, “The Erivan sardar secretly escaped from the fortress and found shelter atthe Turkish border.”
Paskevich met Krasovsky, his heroic detachment, and artillery with enmity. According to Paskevich, it was necessary to give Etchmiadzin to the Persians, rather than to “risk the fate of the war for its salvation,” while Krasovky thought that it was necessary to save the monastery at all costs. Krasovsky’s detachment – from soldiers to officials, including archbishop Nerses – were completely by his side.
Ghazinyan notes that in the last two cases, Abbas Mirza had to hastily leave the Erivan khanate in order to return for defending his own lands.
“On September 9, the Russian troops came out from Etchmiadzin in two columns; Paskevichwas the commander of the main column (it passed to Shagriyarand stood in front of Sardarapad fortress), and the head of the corps staff, graph Pavel Sukhtelen, who had arrived from Petersburg shortly before, was the commander of the second one.The second column crossed the borderline Araks and directed to the Koghb saline quarries (by the way, at that period, rumors about the upcoming seizure of Yerevan by the Russians had already spread among the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, and many families started to move in to the border; in particular, descriptions were preserved about how Sukhtelen’s second column had received the Armenian refugees, who wanted to settle down within the Russian borders),”Ghazinyan writes.
Outlining an intelligence circle, the second column joined the main forces deployed near Sardarapadon September 12. Thanks to the rapidity of actions and strict observance of the secret, Abbas Mirza, who was very close, learnt about Sukhtelen’s movement too late, which impeded him from possessing the reserves.
The same day, it became known that Ivan Paskevich had been awarded the order of St. Vladimir, first degree, and it was celebrated with a feast. When the feast was in full swing, Abbas Mirza left the Ararat plain with his troops.
“The garrison of two thousand of the Sardarapad fortress was under the command of Hasan khan’s grandson, a young man quite unskilled in military science, which highly encouraged Paskevich.
However, by the morning (on approaching the fortress) it was known that Hasan khan had successfully reached the fortification with additional forces at night and taken the command of the garrison in his own hands. Yerevan khan’s brother told the soldiers about his ability to defend fortresses (he also remembered about the 1808 Yerevan events, when he had really managed to take Yerevan back from the Russians), spoke about the inevitability of such scenario’s repetition and made the soldiers vow that they would die on the walls of the fortress,”Ghazinyan writes.
The energetic leader had a significant role in defending the fortress, and Paskevich decided to act with proper persistence, but carefully. Possessing artillery, he wanted to avoid storm and possess Sardarapad with a proper siege. It is natural that lieutenant-generalKrasovskywas appointed the commander of the siege corps.
To be continued
Aris Ghazinyan’s “Yerevan: with a cross or on the cross” is a book about the social and political history of Yerevan and Yerevan district (as a habitat) since the declaration of Christianity to the beginning of XIX century. In addition to demonstrating historical facts based on archive documents and sources, the book also considers the fundamental theses of the Azerbaijani historiography and Pan-Turkic ideology aimed at appropriating the historical, cultural, and spiritual heritage of the Armenians and other nations of the region by falsifying their history.